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Abstract I show that an advertising ban is more likely to increase—rather than
decrease—total consumption when advertising does not bring about a large expansion
of market demand at given prices and when it increases product differentiation (thus
allowing firms to command higher prices). In this case, the main impact of a ban
on advertising is to reduce equilibrium prices and thus increase demand. I argue that
this is more likely to happen in mature industries where consumer goods are ex-ante
(i.e. without advertising) similar and advertising is of the ‘price-increasing’ type.
The ban is the more likely to increase profits of the firms the weaker the ability of
advertising to expand total demand and the less advertising serves to induce product
differentiation.
Keywords Advertising · Bans · Product differentiation · Regulation · Tobacco ·
Alcohol
JEL Classification K2 · L51
This is a substantially revised version of a working paper (Motta 1997) bearing the same title, and long
forgotten in a drawer. I would like to thank H. Fickel and H. Savelkouls for stimulating discussions,
A. Cabrales, A. Ciccone, R. Fauli-Oller, A. Holly, H. Hopenhayn, A. Irmen, J. Markusen, J. Miron,
T. Nilssen, M. Polo, K. Stahl and T. Von Ungern-Sternberg, as well as seminar audiences at Lausanne,
Mannheim, Louvain-la-Neuve, WZB Berlin, Lisbon (Univ. Nova) and Toulouse (European Economic
Association Meeting) for their comments on previous drafts. Thanks also to the Editor, Victor
Aguirregabiria, and two anonymous referees for their suggestions, as well as to Ilaria Masiero for research
assistance. Financial aid from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (project ECO2010-15052)
is gratefully acknowledged.
M. Motta
ICREA-Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona, Spain
M. Motta (B)




62 SERIEs (2013) 4:61–81
1 Introduction and summary
In many countries, complete bans or restrictions on advertising for products which are
often thought of as dangerous or associated to health problems (such as tobacco and
alcoholic drinks) have been advocated. This has led a number of national governments,
especially in OECD countries, to approve regulations which prevent producers and
retailers from advertising such goods or which restrict their advertising activities to
certain media (for instance by prohibiting television and radio commercials).
The rationale behind such limitations on advertising is that advertising raises aggre-
gate demand. By banning or limiting advertising, the desired reduction of consumption
would be obtained.
Yet, there is very little evidence that advertising has a positive impact on the total
demand for the goods advertised, either in general or more specifically in indus-
tries which are more frequently targeted by regulations, like tobacco and alcoholic
drinks. Duffy (1996) surveys most of the empirical works on the effect of advertising
on tobacco consumption (among others, see Baltagi and Levin 1986; Hamilton 1972;
Johnston 1980;McGuinness and Cowling 1975; Radfar 1985; Roberts and Samuelson
1988; Schmalensee 1972) to conclude that such effect is generally small and/or non
significant. Among themost recent studies, the estimates by Nelson andMoran (1995)
suggest that themain effect of alcohol advertising is to reallocate brand saleswith small
or no effect on total consumption.
Some attention has also been devoted to the impact upon aggregate demand of the
advertising bans introduced in several countries. The results are surprising. Schneider
et al. (1981) find that the 1971 US ban on broadcast advertising of tobacco products
has increased consumption, an effect already predicted by Hamilton (1972) study
(but see Baltagi and Levin 1986 for a different view). Stewart and Michael (1993)
analyses data of tobacco consumption in OECD countries for the period 1964–1990.
He estimates a model of per-capita tobacco consumption and finds that the dummy
coefficient for the advertising bans introduced in six OECD countries is positive but
not significant. Duffy (1996) survey of studies on advertising bans concludes that they
are an ineffective policy instrument since they do not manage to reduce consumption.1
Even if the evidence that bans increase consumption is certainly not conclusive,
the very possibility that an increase rather than a decrease of demand may follow
the introduction of advertising restrictions is puzzling. The explanations given by the
authors who have found a positive effect of a ban upon consumption either do not offer
a general explanation or are not always convincing.
Hamilton (1972) work on the US suggests that this result is due to the fact that
by banning broadcast advertising on cigarettes, the anti-smoking publicity has been
reduced as well. Actually, the Fairness Doctrine obliged broadcasters to give a propor-
tion of the time devoted to cigarette advertising to anti-smoking advertisers for them
to air their health warnings (usually the proportion was roughly one third). Because of
the banning of advertising by cigarette producers, the anti-smoking lobbies have lost
the implicit subsidies which allowed their intensive campaigns about the danger of
1 However, in some cases advertising bans do seem to reduce consumption. For instance, Dhar and Baylis
(2011) find that aQuebec ban on fast-food advertising targeting children has reduced fast-food consumption.
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:61–81 63
tobacco consumption. Since Hamilton finds that anti-smoking publicity is more effec-
tive in reducing consumption than advertising in increasing it, a plausible explanation
for the positive effect of the ban on aggregate demand in the US is given. However,
this argument cannot be applied to countries where no Fairness Doctrine exists.
Schneider et al. (1981) suggest that the US broadcasting ban brought about a
decrease in advertising expenditures of the firms, which in turn led to lower ciga-
rette prices and to an increase in demand.
As far as I know, advertising bans have not attracted much attention from theoreti-
cal industrial organisation. An exception is Friedman (1983), who models advertising
expenditures as a capital investment, with the stock of advertising determining the
goodwill level of a firm, which in turn affects demand. He also explicitly accounts for
the externalities that advertising by a firm can have on its rivals. In Friedman’s model
an advertising ban either decreases or leaves unchanged aggregate consumption, but
it could never increase it. Doraszelski and Markovich (2007) also model advertising
in a dynamic way, and they show that an advertising ban favours long-established
brands (whose advertising stock is higher) to the detriment of recent entrants, thereby
increasing market concentration. (They do not study the effect of the ban on total
consumption.)
In a path-breaking paper, Dixit and Norman (1978) analyse the welfare effects of
advertising within an oligopolistic model where firms choose advertising and output
simultaneously.2 They assume that advertising increases prices3 and find that the sign
of the impact of advertising upon consumption cannot be established a priori, a result
consistent with the analysis in the present paper. However, they do not deal explicitly
with advertising bans and their effects, nor does their analysis deal with the impact of
advertising on firms’ profits.
I show in this paper that two effects play a role in determining the impact of advertis-
ing (and advertising restrictions) on the total consumption of a given good. One effect
is direct and I label it expansion effect. It determines the extent to which advertising
attracts new consumers into the market (or expands demand of existing consumers)
for any given prices. The other effect is indirect and I call it price effect of advertising.
It measures how advertising impinges upon prices, for any given level of demand. In
turn, the change in prices will affect demand.
When advertising decreases prices both effects have the same sign. Indeed, the
expansion effect is non-negative, while the reduction in price caused by advertising
would also increase demand. One can therefore conclude that a ban on advertising
would unambiguously decrease aggregate consumption.
When advertising raises prices the net effect upon consumption is a priori ambigu-
ous. The expansion effect is still non-negative, but the price effect works in the oppo-
site direction. Advertising leads to an increase in prices—ceteris paribus—and via
this channel it decreases demand. It is the relative magnitude of the two effects which
2 They find that advertising is socially excessive. This is mainly because a firm decides on advertising
expenditures by looking at its own profitability only and disregarding the possible negative externalities
imposed upon rivals.
3 In their model, the assumption that advertising decreases the firm’s elasticity of demand guarantees that
it raises equilibrium prices.
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determines the net impact of advertising on consumption. In particular, one would
expect a ban to decrease consumption when the expansion effect is small (advertising
does not attract new consumers in the market) and when the price effect of advertising
is strong (for instance, when advertising increases the perceived degree of product
differentiation between competing products).
Since the distinction between price-decreasing and price-increasing advertising is
crucial for the prediction of the effects of advertising regulations on consumption, it
is useful to give examples of situations which can be associated to either case.
To illustrate price-reducing advertising, consider advertising messages—usually
found in local newspapers, radios and televisions - which mainly inform consumers
about the existence of sellers and the prices they charge. In this case, the main effect of
advertising is to foster competition, since it allows comparative shopping and there-
fore tends to reduce perceived product differentiation created by lack of information
(see for instance Grossman and Shapiro 1984). As a result, advertising would decrease
prices, other things being equal, and indirectly increase consumption. Additionally, it
might also have a direct positive effect on demand since it may lead new consumers,
otherwise unaware of the goods, to buy them. Both the price and the market expansion
effect act in the same direction, and an advertising ban would increase prices and
decrease consumption.
There exists some evidence that themarket for professional services fits this picture.
Benham (1972) and Kwoka (1984) find that in the states of the US where advertis-
ing for eyeglasses or optometric visits is not allowed, prices for eyeglasses and visits
are higher than in States where such restrictions do not exist. Similar results have
been obtained by Schroeter et al. (1987) who look at advertising by attorneys and by
Stephen and Frank (1994) who looks at the conveyancing fees charged by solicitors
in Scotland before and after de-regulation of advertising in such field.
As for price-increasing advertising, consider instead advertising campaigns which
do not provide information about prices but try to associate a certain image with a
certain brand. This type of advertising increases brand recognition, enhances loyalty
towards the firm’s products and therefore increases product differentiation and allows
firms to enjoy more market power. Hence, it raises equilibrium prices. This would
in turn reduce consumption, unless advertising might also shift outwards the aggre-
gate demand function for any given level of prices. A priori, therefore, the effect of
price-increasing advertising upon total demand is ambiguous.4
I believe that advertising campaigns for goods such as cigarettes and alcoholic
drinks, which usually refrain from price announcements and try instead to build a
strong brand image, belong to the category of price-increasing advertising, a ban of
which would have ambiguous effects on consumption.
The remainder of this paper is organised in the following way. In Sect. 2, I study the
marginal effect upon demand of advertising expenditures, in a general oligopolistic
model. The marginal analysis gives many insights as to the economics of advertising
bans. In particular, it illustrates the role played by the price effect and the market
4 The reader will have noticed that price-decreasing and price-increasing advertising share some similar-
ities with informative and persuasive advertising. See Tirole and Jean (1988, Sect. 7.3). Doraszelski and
Markovich (2007) prefer instead to distinguish between awareness and goodwill advertising.
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expansion effect of advertising. However, it is not the most proper instrument to study
the effects of a complete ban which implies discrete, rather than marginal, changes in
the level of advertising made by the firms (aggregate demand might be a non-mono-
tonic function of advertising). For this reason, in Sect. 3 I specialise the analysis and
propose a new model which provides an illustration of the two effects mentioned
above and an analysis of possible discrete changes in advertising levels. Addition-
ally, the model allows to gain some insights on the likely effect of a ban on the profits
of the firms in the industry and might therefore help explain the firms’ attitude towards
the imposition of a ban on advertising.5
In this model, advertising increases the degree of product differentiation and thus
the price effect of advertising is quite strong. It turns out that there exists a critical
threshold value of the expansion effect of advertising below which this effect is domi-
nated by the price effect. In otherwords, the lower the direct impact of advertising upon
demand and the more likely that the ban increases consumption via a price reduction
caused by less product differentiation. Given that advertising has a key role in relaxing
market competition and allowing firms to charge higher prices, an advertising ban has
in general a negative effect upon firms’ profits. Only in the rather extreme circum-
stanceswhere firms are selling productswhich are ex-ante—that is, even in the absence
of any advertising—highly differentiated (which implies that advertising is less useful
to relax market competition) and where the expansion effect is extremely small (that
is when advertising tends to attract only consumers which previously patronised rival
products) does the ban increase firms’ profits.
This paper suggests therefore that in sectors where advertising is done to increase
brand recognition (that is, it is persuasive rather than informative), an advertising ban
may have the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, consumption. Similarly, the
model can be interpreted to warn against some recent policy proposals which aim at
imposing brand-less packing for cigarettes. The Australian government, for instance,
is planning to ban logos and branding on tobacco packaging, with all products names
written plainly and with small letters. This would have the effect of decreasing drasti-
cally product differentiation, reducing the firms’ ability to charge high prices for their
cigarettes. While the price decrease will certainly hurt producers,6 it will probably
have the effect of increasing rather than decreasing consumption, especially consid-
ering that cigarette advertising is already prohibited in Australia.
Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion of the results obtained and of the
assumptions made, as well as suggestions for a number of possible extensions.
2 Advertising and quantities: the general model
In this section, I analyse the marginal effects of advertising on aggregate demand.
I assume that oligopolistic firms choose advertising levels in the first stage of the
5 Since the impact of advertising restrictions is ambiguous only when advertising is of a price-increasing
type, the specific example dealt with in Sect. 3 reproduces this feature.
6 Not surprising, cigarette-makers do not like this plan. See e.g. “PhilipMorris battles Australia on cigarette
packaging”, in BBC News/Business website (www.bbc.co.uk.uk/news/business-13923095), posted on 27
June 2011.
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game, and prices in the second stage. This is to represent the idea that advertising is
usually associated to a particular marketing strategy which is a longer-run variable
than market decision variables such as pricing of products. The utility function of the
representative consumer is given by:
U = y + φ(q1, . . . , qn; I1, . . . , In), (1)
where y is a composite good, qi is the i-th good whose market we want to study and Ii
is the investment in advertising of the i-th good. From the maximisation of the utility
of the consumer we obtain the following system of inverse demand functions:
pi = ∂φ(q1, . . . , qn; I1, . . . , In)
∂qi
, i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
We also assume that it is possible to invert this system so as to obtain the direct
demand functions as follows:
qi = f (p1, . . . , pn; I1, . . . , In), i = 1, . . . , n, (3)
where ∂qi/∂pi < 0.
I limit my attention to the case of demand substitutes, and therefore assume that
∂qi/∂p j > 0, with j = i. Throughout the paper I also assume that ∂qi/∂ Ii ≥ 0,
whereas ∂qi/∂ I j can be either positive or negative.
Consider an oligopolistic industry with n firms whose demand schedules are given
above. For simplicity, assume that the n products enter the demand function of con-
sumers in a perfectly symmetric way, and that the firms have identical technologies.
I assume away production costs for simplicity and without major consequences for
the qualitative results. The only cost is given by advertising outlays. I also assume
a convex advertising cost function C(Ii ) identical for all firms. These assumptions
guarantee the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, on which I focus. At the first
stage of the game, the profit function for the i-th firm is given by:
i = pi (I)qi (p(I), I) − C(Ii ), (4)
where pi (I) is the equilibrium price for given vector of advertising levels, to express
the fact that each firm anticipates the outcome of the product market stage of the game,
and where p and I denote respectively the vector of prices and the vector of advertising
levels. Using the envelope theorem, the first-order conditions of the profit-maximising


















Note that a firm might advertise even when there is no direct effect on own demand
(∂qi/∂ Ii = 0), provided that ∑ j =i ∂qi∂p j
∂p j
∂ Ii
> 0. This could be the case, for instance,
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when advertising increases product differentiation, thus allowing firms to set higher
prices.




qi (p(I), I) . (6)
To find the total effect of advertising by firm i on aggregate consumption, let us


















where the assumption of symmetry has been used. The overall impact of advertising
on total consumption is given by two effects, represented by the two terms between
brackets in the above expression. The first effect consists of the price (or indirect)
effect of advertising. For any given level of aggregate demand, increasing the level
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The second effect is given by the expansion (or direct) effect of advertising. It is rea-
sonable to assume that, for any given level of prices, increasing the level of advertising











< 0 (own effect is stronger than cross effects),
the effects of a marginal increase in advertising upon total consumption depend on
which of the two following cases hold.








In the first case, advertising outlays decrease prices that firms can charge at equi-
librium.8 Hence, the price and the expansion effects upon market demand have the
same sign: advertising unambiguously raises demand, and an advertising ban would
decrease it.
The second case is more interesting, since advertising increases equilibrium prices,
thus indirectly decreasing demand. This makes it impossible to tell a priori what
is the effect of an advertising ban. Note that the larger the direct effect (that is the
larger the expansion of market demand at given prices) and the lower the impact of
7 I disregard the possibility that advertising decreases aggregate demand for given price levels. This might
occur when a firm engages in advertising which emphasises negative features of rival products. Some
consumers might cease to patronise the rival good without switching to the advertising firm’s products.
8 Note that it is natural to think that under persuasive advertising ∂pi /∂ Ii is positive, but the overall effect
on other firms’ prices will depend on the strategic interactions among firms.
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advertising on prices for given demand, the more likely that advertising raises aggre-
gate consumption.9
3 An example: advertising increases product differentiation
The analysis carried out in the previous section considers marginal changes of adver-
tising, while an advertising ban involves discrete changes. Furthermore, it says very
little about the effects that an advertising ban might have on the firms’ profits. It
has been suggested that the advertising game has often the features of a prisoners’
dilemma game with the ban allowing the firms to reach a Pareto-superior outcome
(see for instance Scherer 1980), although one can often observe that companies and
trade associations are the main opponents of advertising bans. The impact of bans
upon industry profits does not then seem obvious, and it deserves an investigation.10
Likewise, one would also like to gain some insights about the difficult question of the
welfare effects of an advertising ban in situations where the authorities do not just aim
at reducing consumption but have a welfare function which gives a positive weight to
consumer surplus and profits.
In this section I proceed to formulate a simple new model to deal with these issues.
Since the results obtained in the framework of the more general model in Sect. 2 indi-
cate that the more interesting case occurs when advertising raises prices, I propose a
model which formalises this characteristic.
3.1 Demand and advertising functions
To keep the formalisation in the simplest possible terms, I focus on a duopoly exam-
ple with single-product firms. The generalisation to n firms would be straightforward.
The utility of the consumer is given by the following quadratic function in the style
of Shubik and Levitan (1980) and Singh and Vives (1984):









where the parameters b1b2 and g are affected by advertising as described below. The
inverse demand functions are therefore:
pi = a − bi qi − gq j , a > 0; bi > g > 0; i, j = 1, 2; i = j. (9)
9 The working paper version of this paper (Motta 1997) shows that it is less likely that aggregate consump-
tion decreases with advertising (that is, it is less likely that a ban raises total demand) when products are
sold by a monopolist than when they are sold by oligopolistic firms. This is because the latter would not
internalise the negative externality that advertising might impose on other firms’ demands. This point had
already been noted by Dixit and Norman (1978).
10 Throughout the paper I assume that a ban is obeyed. For instance, firms cannot circumvent the ban on
advertising by resorting to sponsorship of sports events. To see that this assumption is reasonable, consider
that in many OECD countries, both direct and indirect advertising of tobacco products are outlawed.
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From which one can obtain the direct demand functions:
qi = a(b j − g) − b j pi + gp j
bi b j − g2 , i, j = 1, 2; i = j. (10)
Note that at a symmetric equilibrium (bi = b j ; pi = p j ) aggregate demand would
be written as:
Q = q1 + q2 = 2(a − pi )
bi + g . (11)
The analysis in the previous section has shown that the extent to which advertising
outlays increase aggregate demand for any given price level (the “expansion effect”)
is crucial for the determination of the effect of advertising bans upon consumption.
Hence, one would like to have a parameter which measures such an effect. To do
so, assume that advertising outlays Ii affect the demand parameters in the following
way:11
bi = b¯ + l I j ; g = g¯ − Ii − I j ; Ii < g¯/2; l ∈ [0, 2]; i, j = 1, 2; i = j.
(12)
In the symmetric case Ii = I j = I the impact of an increase of the common level
of advertising on aggregate demand at given prices is given by:
∂ Q
∂ I
= 2(a − pi )(2 − l)
(b¯ + g¯ + l I − 2I )2 ≥ 0. (13)
The parameter l is therefore an inverse measure of the “expansion effect” of adver-
tising upon aggregate consumption, since ∂ Q
∂ I is decreasing with l. When l = 0,
advertising expenditures give rise to the maximum expansion of market demand.
When l = 2, such an effect is completely absent. In this extreme case, advertising has
the effect of increasing the degree of product differentiation without modifying the
demand of consumers at given prices (of course, market demand can still be indirectly
affected via price changes).12
Note also the particular way in which advertising modifies own and rival firm’s
demand. Advertising by firm i shifts outwards own demand pi = a − bi qi − gq j as g
decreases. It also affects firm j’s demand, which shifts outwards because of the reduc-
tion of g but which also rotates inwards around its intercept because of the increase
in parameter b j . The magnitude of the latter effect depends on the parameter l. The
higher l the more important the inward rotation in firm j’s demand associated to a
given outward shift in firm i’s demand. Accordingly, higher values of l entail a lower
expansion of aggregate demand.
11 If bi was specified as a function of the competitor’s advertising, advertising would have no business-
stealing effect. See also Sect. 3.4 below for a discussion.
12 See also Sect. 3.4 for two different specifications of the way in which advertising might affect utility
and demand functions in the same class of models.
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Note however that advertising always contains an element of positive externality to
the other firm, since advertising reduces the parameter g and increases the parameter
b j , thus increasing the index of product differentiation which is given by PD = bi b jg2
and raising prices for both firms.13,14 Therefore, (b¯/g¯)2 denotes the ex-ante degree
of product differentiation, that is differentiation in the absence of any advertising.
Note also that advertising by a firm tends to decrease the elasticity of demand of both
firms around a symmetric equilibrium. Indeed, it can be checked that for p1 = p2 = p
and I1 = I2 = I :
∂i
∂ Ii
= −(b¯ + g¯l − l I )p
(b¯ − g¯ + 2I + l I )2(a − p) < 0;
∂i
∂ I j
= −(b¯ + l I )p
(b¯ − g¯ + 2I + l I )2(a − p) < 0. (14)
The fact that advertisingby afirm reduces the elasticity of demandof the rivalmainly
depends on the increase in product differentiation caused by advertising. Owing to the





which determines the sign of the price effect of advertising is always
positive whatever the level of the parameter l.
3.2 The game
Firms play a two-stage game. In the first period they simultaneously choose the levels
of advertising. In the second period, they simultaneously choose prices. We look for
the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
It is straightforward to compute the equilibrium prices, quantities and profits at the
last stage of the game as follows:
p∗i =
a(2bi b j − bi g − g2)
4bi b j − g2 ; (15)
q∗i =
ab j (2bi b j − bi g − g2)
(bi b j − g2)(4bi b j − g2) ; (16)
13 Note that in the standard Hotelling model of product differentiation it would be impossible to carry out
the same analysis I am doing here, since demand is perfectly inelastic to prices and market demand is given.
In a model of this type (see for instance von der Fehr and Stevik 1995) I would not be able to identify
a parameter which measures the (direct) expansion of market demand caused by advertising, nor could I
account for the indirect effect on demand via prices.
14 To my knowledge, the most similar treatments to the one proposed here are to be found in Cabrales
and Motta (2001) and Rosenkranz (2003). In both papers, firms invest to diminish the parameter g, giving
rise to a pure externality effect. The main difference is that here advertising also affects the parameter b j ,
which allows me to control for the expansion effect of demand. See also Vives (1990) for investments which
modify demand parameters in the linear demand model.
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∗i =
a2b j (2bi b j − bi g − g2)2
(bi b j − g2)(4bi b j − g2)2 ; i, j = 1, 2; i = j, (17)
where bi b j and g are functions of advertising levels Ii and I j as assumed above.
Denote dC(Ii )/d Ii as C ′(Ii ). The equilibrium of the whole game is found by solv-
ing d∗i /d Ii = C ′(Ii ). To obtain internal solutions in the interval I ∈ [0, g¯/2),I
assume that the advertising cost function has the following properties: C ′(Ii ) ≥ 0;
C ′(0) = 0; C(0) = 0; lim Ii →g¯/2 C(Ii ) = ∞; lim Ii →g¯/2 C ′(Ii ) = ∞.
Before characterising the equilibrium, however, let us study the aggregate quantity
sold in the market. By focusing on the symmetric case Ii = I j = I and bi = b j = b
and substituting p∗i in the expression of total consumption one obtains:
Q(I ) = 2ab
(b + g)(2b − g) =
2a(b¯ + l I )
(b¯ + g¯ + I (l − 2))(2b¯ − g¯ + 2I (l + 1)) . (18)
Since our objective is to study whether an advertising ban reduces or increases
aggregate consumption, it is useful to define the function Q ≡ Q(I )− Q(0), where
Q(0) = 2ab¯/((b¯ + g¯)(2b¯ − g¯)) is the total quantity sold under a complete advertising
ban.
The sign of Q is crucial to understand the effect of a ban upon consumption. To
study its sign, write the value of I which solves Q = 0 as:
IQ=0 = 2b¯
2(l − 1) + g¯(4b¯ + g¯l)
2b¯(2 + l − l2) . (19)
It is straightforward to check the following:
• Remark 1 At l = 0, IQ=0 = −(b¯ − 2g¯), which is non-negative for b¯ ≤ 2g¯.
• Remark 2 As l approaches 2IQ=0 → ∞.
• Remark 3 The function IQ=0 is increasing in the space (l, I ), since: ∂ IQ=0∂l =
6b¯2−4b¯g¯+2g¯2−4b¯2l+8b¯g¯l+2b¯l2+g¯2l2
2b¯(2+l−l2)2 > 0.
• Remark 4 In the space (l, I ) the function IQ=0 shifts to the right when b¯ increases




2b¯2(2+l−l2) is negative on all the relevant domain, since the
function IQ=0 makes sense only for l ∈ [0, 1 − g¯b¯ ). Outside this interval, a firm’s
advertising expenditures I would exceed g¯/2, which is excluded by assumption.
Also: ∂ IQ=0
∂ g¯ = − 2b¯+g¯lb¯2(2+l−l2) > 0.
The curve IQ=0 is drawn in Fig. 1 for given values of the parameters b¯ and g¯. The
figure also shows that higher (lower) values of b¯ (g¯) holding fixed the other parameter
would shift the curve to the right.
This figure helps us understand the effects of a ban. Imagine for instance that the
equilibrium value I ∗ lies to the right of the curve IQ=0. This would imply that
Q(I ∗) < Q(0). In other words, the ban would increase aggregate consumption. One
can then apply the same argument to interpret Remarks 1 and 2 above.
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Fig. 1 Effect of the ban on aggregate quantity
Remark 2 tells us that nomatter which equilibrium level of advertising occurs when
l = 2, that is when advertising does not have any effect on aggregate consumption
for given price levels, an advertising ban would always increase aggregate consump-
tion. This is because whatever I ∗ will always fall in the area where the inequality
Q(I ∗) < Q(0) holds.
Remark 1 is of less straightforward interpretation, since the position of the curve
at l = 0 depends on the values of the parameters b¯ and g¯. We can identify two cases:
• b¯ > 2g¯.
In this case the equilibrium level of advertising I ∗ > 0 would always fall in an area
where Q(I ∗) > Q(0). Hence, an advertising ban would certainly reduce consump-
tion.
• b¯ ≤ 2g¯.
Here we have two possibilities: either the actual equilibrium value I ∗ lies above the
curve IQ=0, in which case a ban reduces aggregate consumption; or it lies below
the curve, in which case a ban increases aggregate consumption. This uncertainty
can be resolved only by finding the actual equilibrium value I ∗.15
The previous analysis confirms the role played by the direct effect of advertising
on market demand expansion (inversely related to the parameter l) in determining the
sign an advertising ban has upon aggregate consumption. As a first result, we have
15 However, note that for b¯ → g¯ one has IQ=0 → g¯/2. This means that when goods are ex-ante
homogenous the locus of the equilibrium levels of advertising will always lie below the curve IQ=0.
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:61–81 73
seen that when l is large enough (that is, when the expansion effect of advertising is
weak enough) an advertising ban increases consumption, a finding which confirms
the results obtained in Sect. 2. To complete our analysis, let us turn to the study of
equilibrium advertising expenditures.
3.3 Specifying the cost function: equilibrium solutions
To find the solutions of the whole game I assume the following cost function:









, k ≥ 0. (20)
This function satisfies the properties required above for getting interior solutions
in the interval 0 ≤ Ii < g¯/2.
With such a cost function (but also with other simpler convex functions) solutions
can be found only with the help of a computer programme. Figure 1 illustrates the
symmetric equilibrium I ∗ as a function of l. The curves have been drawn for values
of b¯ as specified in the figure, and for the following values of the parameters: g¯ = 2
(so that advertising expenditures are normalised to be between 0 and 1), k = 1a = 10.
I hold these values fixed for all the numerical solutions without any major loss for the
analysis. Indeed, g¯ affects the results only when it changes with respect to b¯, so that
the effect of a decrease in g¯ upon the equilibrium solutions is identical to the effect of
an increase in b¯. The parameter k enters in a multiplicative way in the cost function,
and its effect on the equilibrium level of advertising is therefore straightforward: when
k rises, marginal costs of advertising also rise, and the locus of the equilibrium points
shifts downwards. As for parameter a, it enters in a multiplicative way in the gross
profit function. An increase in a would therefore shift the equilibrium locus upwards.
A priori, it is not clear what is the effect of an increase in l upon the equilibrium val-
ues of advertising. On the one hand, an increase in l means that fewer new consumers
are attracted into the market, which lowers the incentive to spend in advertising. On
the other hand, l is also a measure of the negative externality imposed upon the rival
firm. Other things being equal, a higher l means that an additional unit of advertising
expenditures entails a wider inward rotation of the demand curve of the rival. This
creates a stronger incentive to advertise since it increases profitability. This ambiguity
is reflected in the fact that I ∗ is negatively sloped for ex-ante more similar goods (b¯
closer to g¯) but positively sloped when goods are already highly differentiated in the
absence of advertising.
An increase in b¯ makes the curve shifts downwards. This is because for any given
g¯, a higher b¯ implies a rise in the “ex-ante” index of product differentiation (i.e. the
degree to which products are differentiated when advertising does not exist). In turn,
this reduces the incentive to increase product differentiation and therefore lowers the
optimal value of advertising outlays. Likewise, when g¯ decreases with respect to b¯,
this increases ex-ante differentiation and creates less incentive to spend in advertising
to further differentiate the competing brands.
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This result clearly contrasts with the well-known Dorfman and Steiner (1954) the-
orem, according to which advertising increases with the firm’s market power. Here
it is the opposite, since firms advertise precisely to increase their market power, and
such an incentive is the stronger the lower the market power they have (that is, the
more homogenous the goods ex-ante).16
The intersection between the curves I ∗ and IQ=0, which occurs at l = l˜ (see
Fig. 1, where for simplicity l˜ has been drawn only for the case where b¯ = 3g¯) is
crucial:
• If l˜ < 0, a complete advertising ban increases aggregate consumption ∀l.
• If l˜ ≥ 0, then:
– For l ∈ [0, l˜] a complete ban decreases aggregate consumption.
– For l ∈ (l˜, 2] a complete ban increases aggregate consumption.
Indeed, for l ∈ [0, l˜], the equilibrium level of advertising lies above the curve
IQ=0, implying that Q(I ∗) is bigger than Q(0). That is, the total quantity sold at
the unconstrained equilibrium is larger than is the total quantity sold under a ban on
advertising. For l ∈ (l˜, 2], the opposite happens.
Figure 1 also illustrates that when the ex-ante degree of product differentiation rises
(b¯ increases with respect to g¯), the intersection between the two curves moves to the
right. This means that it is less likely that an advertising ban has the undesired effect
of increasing total consumption when products are ex-ante differentiated. Instead,
products whose different brands are hardly distinguishable in the absence of labeling
and brand-name fidelity are more likely than others to be associated with a rise in
consumption after an advertising ban. In other words, the less differentiated are the
products ex-ante the stronger the price effect of advertising. In turn, the more likely
that the prohibition of advertising increases consumption.17
The effect of the ban on profits
To find the effect of the bans on profits, I follow a similar procedure as the one used
to uncover the effect on consumption. Define the function π ≡ π(I )−π(0), where
π(I ) is a firm’s profit at a symmetric level of advertising expenditures and π(0) a
firm’s profit under a ban. By substitution into the second stage profit, this function can
be written:
π = a
2(b¯ + l I )(b¯ − g¯ + I + l I )
(2b¯ − g¯ + 2I + 2l I )2(b¯ + g¯ − 2I + l I )
− 8k I
2
g¯2(g¯ − 2I ) −
a2b¯(b¯ − g¯)
4b¯3 − 3b¯g¯2 + g¯3 . (21)
16 See also Becker and Murphy (1988) for a critique of the Dorfman–Steiner’s theorem.
17 Cigarettes and colas would probably be good examples of “ex-ante” homogenous products. Results of
blind-tests for these goods usually show that consumers are unable to make out their favourite brand from
rival ones.
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Fig. 2 Effect of the ban on profits
Figure 2 draws the function Iπ=0 in the space (l, I ). Below the curve, π(I ) is
higher than π(0). Above it, the opposite. The same figure also shows the locus I ∗ of
the equilibrium solutions of the game. For low values of b¯ with respect to g¯, the curve
Iπ=0 lies above the equilibrium schedule, implying that firms are always worse off
under an advertising ban. It is only when b¯ becomes very high relative to g¯ that the
ban might give higher profits to the firms. However, this occurs only for relatively
high values of l, that is when the expansion effect is low enough. Said otherwise, an
advertising ban might be beneficial to the firms only if they produce goods which are
already highly ex-ante differentiated and if advertising expenditures are not likely to
increase aggregate demand but rather to shift consumers across firms.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Advertising in this model plays a twofold
role. First, it relaxes market competition between firms. Second, it increases aggre-
gate demand at given prices. When products are already highly differentiated, there is
little benefit from advertising as a way to relax market competition. When aggregate
demand reacts little to advertising, advertising expenditures are collectively damaging.
The combination of these two elements gives the result above.
I believe that this model illustrates the current views of practitioners about adver-
tising bans. Indeed, the most widespread view in tobacco firms seems to be that an
advertising ban would lead to a price war, thus hurting the firms but at the same
time increasing consumption. In a recent interview, a Philip Morris’ manager has
been quoted to say: “Like most consumer goods, cigarettes are marketed on image...If
you take away that marketing tool, take away the manufacturer’s ability to compete
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on image, then price will become the main factor in seizing market share”.18 In a
less colourful way one might rationalise these views by saying that an advertising
ban would prevent firms from creating perceived product differentiation thus making
them unable to keep high prices, which in turn might stimulate aggregate demand.
This outcome is captured by the example I have proposed.
Welfare effects
When focusing on the effects of an advertising ban on total consumption, I have been
implicitly assuming that reduction of consumption is the main objective of a govern-
ment, as is often the case in reality. This can be rationalised by assuming that negative
externalities due to consumption of the product carry most of the weight in a welfare
function such as: W = (1 − θ)(CS + PS) − θ Q2, where θ ∈ [0, 1] would be the
weight the government gives to the externality function.
When a government attaches most of the weight in the welfare function to the
externalities created by consumption, then the question of whether the ban increases
welfare tends to coincide with the question of whether the ban manages to reduce
consumption, which is precisely the main question I address in this paper.
When the government does not care only about externalities the welfare effects of
the ban depend on its impact not only on consumer surplus (recall also that adver-
tising directly affects the parameters of the demand function) but also on profits and
externalities, and the analysis gets much more complex. In the simple case where
the government does not attach any importance to the existence of externalities of
consumption, we have seen that an advertising ban might increase welfare precisely
because it has the effect of increasing (instead of decreasing) demand for the good. This
is the more likely to occur the stronger the price effect and the weaker the expansion
effect of advertising.
3.4 Other possible examples
The parametric model presented above was chosen mainly to illustrate the effects put
in evidence in the general framework studied in section 2. Many other specific models
can be studied, but I believe that the results obtained under alternative specifications
can still be understood in terms of the price and market expansion effects. Let me
briefly discuss two other possible examples which have somehow extreme alternative
features.
A first alternative model can be obtained by adopting a slightly different variant of
the example considered above. If advertising expenditures affected demand parame-
ters as bi = b¯ + l Ii , then the business-stealing effect of advertising would completely
disappear, and the positive price externality would be dominant. This formulation
would make the model similar to a Hotelling-type model where investments by a firm
to move away from a central location would impart a double positive externality on
18 See Rawstorne (1990).
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the rival: first because it relaxes price competition, and then because it gives it a larger
captive market. The “price effect” in such a model would be even stronger. Under this
specification, it is possible to show that the ban increases consumption under similar
conditions as those found in the previous model. However, the firms’ profits would
never increase under the ban, a result which is not surprising given the strong (positive)
effect that advertising outlays have upon prices.
In Motta (1997) I consider a rather different model where I reproduce few essential
features of a richer model due to Friedman (1983). In this model, advertising raises the
willingness to pay of consumers without affecting the degree of product differentiation
between goods. To keep the example as close as possible to the previous ones, assume
that consumers have the following utility function: U = y + a1q1 + a2q2 − b(q21/2+
q22/2) − gq1q2. This gives rise to the inverse demand functions pi = ai − bqi − gq j ,
and direct demand functions:
qi = ai b − a j g − bpi + gp j
b2 − g2 , ai > 0; b > g > 0; i, j = 1, 2; i = j. (22)
Assume that advertising expenditures affect demand parameters as follows:
ai = a¯ + Ii + eI j ; e ∈ [−1, 1]; i, j = 1, 2; i = j. (23)
In the symmetric case Ii = I j = I the parameter e is a directmeasure of the “expan-
sion effect” of advertising upon aggregate consumption, since ∂ Q/∂ I = (1 + e)/
(b¯2 − g¯2) ≥ 0.
By assuming the cubic cost function of advertising Ci = k I 3i /3, the usual two-
stage game where firms first simultaneously decide advertising expenditures and then
prices can be fully solved and analytic solutions can be easily found.19
The main result is that—like in Friedman (1983) but unlike the examples analysed
above—an advertising ban never increases consumption.20 The main intuition for this
result comes from the fact that advertising increases the consumers’ willingness to
pay for the good advertised but does not modify the degree of product differentiation
between the competing goods.21 As a result, the price effect of advertising is less strong
than in the previous model and it never dominates the expansion effect. Furthermore,
the model shows the very special feature that when the expansion effect decreases, so
does the price effect.
Yet, the magnitude of the expansion effect still plays an important role, since the
fewer new consumers are attracted into the market by advertising the less effective
the ban in reducing aggregate consumption. In the extreme case where advertising
just shifts consumers among firms without attracting new demand, the ban does not
19 See Motta (1997) for details.
20 Another difference with respect to the other models examined above is that the Dorfman–Steiner’s
condition holds good here. Exogenously given product differentiation raises the marginal revenue from
advertising, thus increasing the incentive to engage in such expenditures.
21 In this specification, the index of product differentiation is given by b2/g2, which is not affected by
advertising.
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change total consumption at all. This confirms the importance of the role played by
the expansion effect of advertising.
The impact of the ban upon firms’ profits depends on the expansion effect as well,
like in the other model previously analysed. The stronger the negative externality
imposed by a firm’s advertising on rival firm’s demand the more likely that the ban
results in higher profits for the firms.
4 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper has been to analyse the impact of an advertising
ban on total consumption. A general model has showed that two effects are crucial in
determining such an impact. The first effect relates to the extent to which advertising
expands aggregate demand at given prices. The second consists of the way in which
advertising affects prices for any given level of demand. In particular, an advertising
ban is more likely to increase total consumption when advertising expenditures do
not expand the total market and when prices increase in a considerable manner due to
advertising. If advertising decreased prices (as might be the case when firms engage in
advertising which makes comparative shopping easier) a ban would always decrease
consumption.
I have then proceeded to illustrate these main findings with the help of a model
which has also allowed me to discuss the effects of an advertising ban upon the profits
of the firms. I have showed that a ban is the more likely to increase firms’ profits the
weaker the expansion effect and the weaker the price effect of advertising. Although
I believe that these findings would prove robust to possible alternative specifications,
there are a number of features in this paper which are admittedly special and which
deserve some comments.
• Entry Throughout the paper I have considered only the case of an exogenously
given number of firms.22 However, one might be interested in studying how the
ban affects the number of firms which would coexist in the industry at equilibrium.
In general, I would expect the answer to depend on a number of variables, among
which the relative importance of the expansion and price effects mentioned above.
Dixit and Norman (1978) have found that it is not possible to establish a priori
whether more advertising allows more or fewer firms to operate in the industry,
whereas Doraszelski and Markovich (2007) find in their model that advertising
bans increases concentration because it makes it more difficult for recent entrants
to establish their brand image, a result which receives some empirical confirmation
in Clark (2007), which finds that an advertising ban in Quebec has increased market
shares of long-established firms.
• Asymmetry I have not departed from the assumption of symmetry, which is very
convenient but also very strong. Again, I feel that many insights would still apply
to a situation where firms differ in their technologies and initial market positions.
However, there are a number of interesting issues which arise under asymmetry
22 In the models of Sect. 3 I have analysed a duopoly but the results carry over to a number n of oligopolists
without difficulties.
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and which only an accurate analysis might properly address. In particular, it would
be interesting to understand which kind of firms is more likely (if at all) to benefit
from the introduction of a ban. An interesting application could be given by the
tobacco industry in the European Union. In many countries tobacco has been heav-
ily regulated and state monopolies have existed for a long time. If outsiders can gain
market shares mostly or uniquely through advertising, and if big multinationals are
more efficient in their advertising activities than the local monopolies (in terms of
the models above, the incumbent would have a higher advertising cost parameter k
than the entrants), then the ban would protect the state monopolies (insiders) and
hurt the big multinational firms (outsiders).23
• Quantity competition In the paper I have focused on price competition, both in the
general model and in the specific examples. This allowed me to illustrate the expan-
sion and price effects of advertising more neatly. None the less, the basic insights of
the analysis can be reproduced in a model where the firms’ strategic variable at the
product market competition stage is quantity rather than price. Although I do not
reproduce them for shortness, it is easy to check that the qualitative results obtained
in the models proposed in Sect. 3 still hold good under the hypothesis of quantity
competition.24 Furthermore, there would have been no reason to suspect that the
mode ofmarket competition sensitively affects the result. Indeed, Dixit andNorman
(1978) find that advertising does not necessarily increase quantity in a model where
firms compete on quantities.
• Partial equilibrium By focusing on a partial equilibrium model, I cannot capture
the effects of a ban on other sectors. In particular, some commentators (and lobby-
ists) claim that a ban would have the strongest effects upon newspapers, radio and
television channels whose revenues are highly dependent on the advertising space
sold to the firms. Neither this, nor other general equilibrium effects can be captured
in the framework of analysis proposed here.
• Advertising as capital assets Advertising expenditures can be seen as investments
which contribute to create a stock of goodwill (see Friedman 1983; Roberts and
Samuelson 1988; Doraszelski and Markovich 2007). Within this perspective, an
advertising ban would not have an immediate effect upon consumption and profits,
since the willingness to pay of consumers would decrease only over time. This
should obviously be taken into account in an empirical work on the effects of a ban.
Although the paper does not account for the delayed impact of a ban, it does capture
the long-run effects of it. The formulation proposed here would be equivalent to
the comparative statics between long-run equilibria in a more sophisticated model
where advertising acts as a capital asset.
• Different age groups For many products such as tobacco and alcohol advertising is
often directed towards young people who are not usual consumers. One might want
23 This argument has been suggested by commentators who noted that strict bans were enforced in Portu-
gal, Italy and France, where state monopolies are strong. This might also imply that the true government
objective would not be a decrease in consumption, but a welfare function where profits of national firms
have a considerable weight.
24 Details are available from the author upon request. One of the advantages of the models presented above
is that it is possible to analyse both price and quantity competition, a property not always shared by many
models of product differentiation.
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to analyse the different impact of advertising on different age groups, by assuming
that there are two generations of consumers, one which has already consumed the
good in the past and is “addicted” to it; and a second generation which has never
consumed the product. Some of these effects might be partly captured by the model
presented here. In particular, the magnitude of the expansion effect is related to the
importance of the generation of “new” consumers. However, the full consequences
of such a framework of analysis could be properly investigated only within a model
where the existence of two different generations is rigorously formalised. In par-
ticular, one could think of extending the model of rational addiction proposed by
Becker and Murphy (1988) and tested by Becker et al. (1994) to study the effects of
advertising on consumption. The price and expansion effects of advertising might
be analysed in that richer framework of analysis.
• Taxes and other instruments My analysis has been restrictive in that I have con-
sidered just one of the many instruments available to a government which wants
to reduce consumption. For instance, a consumption tax increase might be the best
instrument to meet such a goal. However, higher taxes often encourage contraband.
Insofar as smuggling from neighbouring countries might be increased by a tax level
beyond a certain threshold, it is possible that this introduces cheaper units of the
good in the market, thus countering the reduction in consumption. A completely
different model than the one proposed here would be needed to deal with these
issues. Even resorting to total prohibition of a given good might not be a straight-
forward way to reduce externalities associated with consumption. First, prohibition
might stimulate the existence of a parallel market on which the authorities have
little control, increase the use of violence, and encourage the production of poor
quality substitutes which are more harmful than the good whose consumption one
wants to reduce. Second, it is not clear that outlawing a certain good would be an
effective tool to reduce consumption. Dills et al. (2005) finds empirical evidence
that alcohol prohibition in the US might even have increased alcohol consumption.
A possible explanation for such a result is that prohibition might actually decrease
prices. A producer which operates in the black market and violates the lawwill have
a lower marginal cost of evading all regulation and taxes. Hence, costs and prices
might actually fall. These are all interesting issues which should be analysed in a
formal framework.
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